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China’s Role in Burma’s Development
Neil Renwick
Abstract China has been a long-standing partner for Burma (Myanmar), providing important political,
military and economic support. Burma’s reform process poses new questions and challenges for China.
China’s interests in Burma are primarily economic-driven by its need for strategic resources and are highly
controversial. This study argues that China’s approach to Burma’s development is determined by its own
national economic interests. Beijing’s view is that this is a ‘win-win’ situation. This is a view under critical
review in Burma as it seeks to re-balance its foreign relationships. This article details the critical point at
which Sino–Burmese relations now stand, explains Burma’s current development profile, outlines Chinese
involvement in Burma and explains China’s development approach to Burma in terms of China’s national
economic, political and security interests.
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1 Introduction
Burma’s post-2011 reforms have excited worldwide
interest; attracted by the prospect of new political,
economic and strategic opportunities. Although
there have been testing times in the relationship,
the lowest ebb being in the late 1960s, from the
late 1980s China has been a long-standing partner
of Burma through the years of military rule and
international ostracism. During the decades of
Burma’s international isolation, China provided
important diplomatic support at the United
Nations and in the Asia–Pacific region, substantial
military armaments, vital investment and
infrastructural capacity-building assistance and a
market for Burmese goods. For its part, China
gained access to Burma’s rich endowment of raw
materials, energy resources and strategic access to
the Indian Ocean.
However, Sino–Burmese relations are now at a
crossroads. Burma’s unfolding political landscape
poses new questions and challenges for the
Beijing leadership and its core national interests
in its neighbour. China’s political and strategic
interests in Burma are important and cannot be
discounted easily. But the reality is that Beijing’s
interests in Burma are primarily economic-
driven by its need for strategic resources. This
may change as China’s specific engagement with
international ‘development’ norms and practices
evolves. Currently, though, Burma’s
‘development’, as a Chinese national interest
and as a foreign policy objective in its own right,
is not central to China’s approach. Development
is salient insofar as any new spur to regional
economic growth offers new economic
opportunities and a potential magnifier effect.
But this is a spin-off, a beneficial consequence of
the pursuit of Chinese trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI) intended to meet China’s
economic imperatives and reified through
Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE)
operations. In the Chinese view, China’s trade
and FDI are not critical to Burmese development
and are not inimical to it – quite the opposite. By
trading and investing with Burma and by actively
contributing to its infrastructural capacity
building, China is also contributing substantively
to Burma’s ‘development’. Indeed, from Burma’s
standpoint, this infrastructural capacity building
is an imperative to achieve economic
development. From an Asian perspective, this is
also advantageous insofar as it comes with little
or no ‘strings attached’; no weighty requirements
for human rights, democratisation or market-
oriented reforms in return for economic relations
or aid donor largesse.
China shares a 2,200km border with northern
and eastern Burma. Building upon the historical
circulation of goods, people and cultural
influences, fraternal ties gained additional
complexity during their respective periods of
colonial and semi-colonial subjugation and
nationalist and anti-colonial contests.
China’s own economic reforms have taken
860 million Chinese citizens out of poverty and,
despite its own continuing problems with widening
inequality, has an experience and development
story that ought to inform its understanding of its
Burmese partner’s development needs and China’s
potential contribution.
Yet, as in Africa, Latin America and parts of
Southeast Asia, China’s operations in Burma are
controversial. There have been public protests
against large-scale, high-profile mining,
hydroelectric, forestry, mining, and energy
projects involving Chinese SOEs; issues range
from ‘land-grabs’, to lost employment and
environmental degradation, and loss of
livelihoods and food supplies. The Thein Sein
leadership responded to this discontent in
September 2012 by suspending work on the
Letpadaung copper mine until 2015.
The following analysis examines issues
surrounding China’s presence in Burma. The
article is structured in four parts. Following this
introduction setting out the historic juncture at
which Sino–Burmese relations now stand, the
article explains Burma’s current development
profile; the political and economic gains arising
from the post-2011 reform process, the
continuing challenges it is actively and robustly
seeking to confront and overcome, and the new
national development framework and plan. It
reviews Burma’s overall trade, FDI and
development assistance indicators as the
principal means of achieving the government’s
development aims. The article then turns its
attention to China’s approach to Burma and
outlines current Chinese engagement in the
country and explains China’s development
approach to Burma in terms of China’s national
economic, political and security interests. The
final part provides concluding comments.
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2 Burma in development
Once one of Southeast Asia’s economic jewels,
years of military rule and international pariah
status has distorted Burma’s economic
development. Burma is the largest territory on
mainland Southeast Asia, and second largest in
the region as a whole, after Indonesia. It shares
borders with five neighbouring states, including
India and China. The watchword for Burma today
is ‘potential’ – human, economic and political.
Economically, Burma’s trade and inward
investment are growing as domestic regulatory,
legal, financial, corporate and administrative
reforms take hold and the international
community steadily dismantles its sanctions
regimes against Burma. Politically, democratic
reforms, elections and a commitment to ‘good
governance’, the release of political prisoners and
addressing of human rights abuses, an opening
up of the space for civil society organisations and
community groups and peace agreements with
ethnic military groups have already transformed
the landscape in quick time (Amnesty
International 2013). Following political reforms
and Burma’s agreement with international
donors on development assistance governance,
assistance has flooded in (IndexMundi 2012)
from European, Asia–Pacific and North American
states and from Japan as well as international
organisations such as the EU, World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), targeting a
broad spectrum of development needs from
infrastructure, health, education, policing,
community enterprise, governance and
administration to sovereign debt.
Burma is also resource-rich in its human and
material assets. It has a population of over
61 million with an annual population growth rate
of 1.1 per cent (ADB 2013), significant
improvements in sanitation and water and in
health with successful HIV/AIDS and TB
programmes and morbidity and mortality rates
for malaria already cut by half over the past seven
years (UNDP 2013b) and an adult literacy rate of
92.3 per cent. Rangoon and Mandalay are cities
with sizeable, and largely younger, populations of
five and one million respectively, a ready
workforce. Releasing this human potential is a
vital necessity for Burma’s future development.
This is, in turn, linked to the exploitation of the
country’s resources for economic sustainable
growth – arable land, forestry, minerals, natural
gas, freshwater and marine resources; Burma is
also a leading source of gemstone and jade.
Exports of Burmese jade are booming, so much so
that it is now a source of growing concern.
Clearly, economic growth is the principal driver
for Burma’s development, albeit not the only
one. Since taking office in 2010, the civilian
government has initiated a wide-ranging
programme of economic and financial reforms to
shift the country to an open market economy.
These have included currency floatation, new
fiscal regulations to rationalise personal income
tax and reduce consumption tax,
telecommunications sector liberalisation, private
sector reforms and attracting FDI, a review of
the financial sector, promotion of access to
finance, and creating an economic climate
conducive to job creation. According to World
Bank data, the country’s economy grew at 7.3 per
cent in 2012/13. The main engines of growth
were raised gas production, the services and
construction sectors, FDI and strong commodity
exports. The World Bank estimates that the
economy will grow at 7.5 per cent in 2013/14 and
increasing to 7.8 per cent in the medium term
based on a continuing rise in gas production,
increased trade and improved performance in
agriculture. Burma’s GDP is estimated to have
been US$55 billion in 2012/13 (World Bank
2014). Burma’s total foreign trade in 2012 was
US$13.3 billion, contributing to about 27 per
cent of its GDP.
The country’s ability to achieve its development
aims depends not only on economic growth but
also on processes of democratisation and
enhanced governance practices. The dismantling
of military rule has seen national elections in
2010 and by-elections in April 2012 with further
by-elections due in late 2014 and national
elections in November 2014. The civilian
government has initiated reforms including
parliamentary representation and rules,
corruption and transparency, civil society
participation, political prisoners and human
rights. The task of political development reforms
is, like the economic and societal challenges,
simply immense and the challenge of overcoming
entrenched practices and interests sizeable. For
example, entwined political and economic
corruption, reified into Burma’s governmental
and business structures and systems during
military rule (Taylor 2001), will be hard to
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eradicate (Asia Tribune 2012). Indicative of the
scale of the task is Burma’s low ranking in the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2012 by
Transparency International (TI). Burma
occupied 172nd place out of 176 countries
reviewed (TI 2012).
Attaining the development aims also requires
societal stability and peace. The government has
moved quickly to try and resolve the country’s
long-standing ethnic conflicts, although many
challenges remain. The government has reached
preliminary peace accords with all 11 of the main
armed ethnic groups, following preliminary
agreement with the Kachin Independence
Organisation (KIO) on 30 May 2013 (Australian
Government 2014).
Nevertheless, despite this, Burma’s development
challenge is substantial. For example, Burma’s
agricultural sector is weakened, pushing growing
numbers of unskilled workers into the labour
force where low remuneration and job seasonality
causes many of these workers to migrate
internally or abroad. According to the Swiss
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC),
over 10 per cent of the total population are
estimated to be working abroad. Participation in
the national labour force is 50 per cent of women
compared to 83 per cent of men, and 4.6 per cent
of women are unemployed as opposed to 3.7 per
cent of men. ‘Unequal access to jobs and
resources, compounded by the growing income
gap, remain challenges to peaceful development’
(SDC 2013: 9).
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) classifies Burma in the low human
development category. Burma’s Human
Development Index (HDI) value was 0.498,
ranking it 149 out of 187 countries and territories
for 2012. Between 1980 and 2012, Burma’s HDI
value rose from 0.281 to 0.498, an increase of
77 per cent or average annual increase of about
1.8 per cent (UNDP 2013b: 2). Burma had an
estimated GDP per capita of US$868 in 2012/13
(World Bank 2014); over one-quarter of the
Burmese population live below the national
poverty line, there is an under-five mortality rate
of 62 per 1,000 live births (ADB 2013), 32 per
cent of children under five suffer from
malnutrition (World Bank 2014), and only around
half of the children enrolled in primary school
actually complete it (MPED 2011). Human
Rights Watch reports that, despite the new
Burmese government’s commitments to the UN
Security Council to tackle the issue and become a
model of behaviour, ‘the longstanding trade in,
and systematic abuse of, child soldiers’ in Burma
persists in the face of Burmese military obduracy
(Becker 2013). Burma is ethnically highly diverse.
The government recognises 135 separate ethnic
groups. The main groups include Burman/Bamar,
Shan, Karen/Kayin, Kachin, Chin, Rakhine, Mon
and Karenni/Kayah.
This is a culturally rich facet of Burmese society.
However, it is also a source of tension, division,
violent abuse and conflict; generating societal
instability, dislocation and disharmony in parts of
Burma. Burma carries the scars of the inter-
ethnic conflicts with human rights abuses and
the loss of life, livelihoods and homes. It is
estimated that such conflict has led to millions of
persons being displaced over recent decades.
Currently, there are around 140,000 refugees in
Thailand and about 200,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) live in the southeast of the
country. An additional 300,000 have been
displaced recently due to renewed armed conflict
in Kachin State and civil unrest in Rakhine State
(SDC 2013: 10).
While the overall demographic distribution is
one in which the population density is low –
spread out across the country with around 70 per
cent of the population living in rural areas, the
remainder are found in the cities of Yangon
[Rangoon] (five million), Mandalay (1.3 million)
and Mawlamyine [Moulmein] (600,000). This is
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Table 1 Burma: Ethnic groups and religions
Ethnic groups (%) Religions (%)
Burman 68 Buddhist 89
Shan 9
Kayin (Karen) 7 Christian 4
Rakhine (Arakanese) 4
Chinese 3 Muslim 4
Mon 2
Indian 2 Animist 1
Miscellaneous 5 Miscellaneous 2
Source Network Myanmar; http://networkmyanmar.org/
images/stories/PDF/stats2009.pdf.
2Gu&Carty IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:51  Page 73
problematic given that transport links are poor
and highly vulnerable to intense climatic events
(virtually half of all roads are made impassable
during the monsoon season) and
telecommunications and internet capacity is
extremely limited. Only about one-quarter of
Burmese have access to electricity. Rural poverty
is double that found in urban centres and
particularly high among the largely minority
ethnic populations of Burma’s border provinces
and those regions emerging from conflict.
2.1 Burma’s development aims
Burma’s development path is set within the
overall objectives of the reform process. There
are four primary reform objectives: (1) balanced
and proportionate growth among all states and
divisions; (2) prioritisation of food security and
amelioration of the agricultural sector;
(3) development that is all-inclusive; and
(4) ensuring the reliability of statistics and an
overall improvement in primary data collection
(Asia Tribune 2012). In May 2012, President
Thein Sein set out the country’s approach to
national development (Thin 2013). He identified
the reform mechanisms by which Burma would
achieve economic development by attracting
international ODA and FDI and the
administrative framework for managing and
disbursing such funds as they are received. The
goal is to triple GDP per capita in five years to
US$3,900. To attract ODA, political reforms, the
April 2012 elections and release of some political
prisoners led to the easing of international
sanctions. To draw in FDI, monetary and
currency reforms were followed by a new Foreign
Investment Law.
The government’s aims are embodied in the
Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR)
presented at Burma’s first Development
Cooperation Forum in January 2013 and the
National Comprehensive Development Plan
(NCDP).
These emphasise the importance of cutting
poverty through infrastructural, agricultural and
social development, ‘including the creation of
“good governance and clean government”,
private sector-led growth, and the use of
participatory approaches’ (SDC 2013: 11). But
the consultation and policy formulation process
was criticised by some aid organisations for being
based on a series of working groups drawn in
large part from economic institutes in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and Japan with limited civil societal participation
(Oxfam 2014). A second Forum was held in late
January 2014, under the theme of ‘Accelerating
Actions for Progress through Enhancing
Inclusive Coordination’; participants included
the government of Burma, members of
parliament, international development partners,
and representatives of civil society, the private
sector and academia. The government made
three commitments: (1) Finalise the Nay Pyi Taw
Accord Action Plan to ensure the continued
implementation of the Accord; (2) Ensure
continued support for the FESR and the NCDP;
(3) Strengthen government capacity to lead
development efforts and engage with public and
private actors in the planning and
implementation processes. A third Forum is
scheduled for January 2015.
The strategy for achieving these development
aims is to promote the inter-connected drivers of
growth: trade, FDI and aid. Taking a quick look at
these, starting with trade, we have already noted
above Burma’s encouraging economic growth.
Despite returning a trade deficit for the first nine
months of 2013, Burma recorded a trade surplus
of US$406.6 million in December of 2013. From
2010 until 2013, Burma’s balance of trade
averaged US$3.83 million, peaking in August
2011 at US$593.3 million and a deficit of
US$639.8 million in June 2011. International
marginalisation meant that the years of military
rule saw Burma trading primarily with its
immediate neighbours out of necessity and
expediency, albeit across turbulent borders.
Exports consist mainly of oil and natural gas with
the remainder accounted for by vegetables, wood,
fish, clothing, rubber and fruits. In terms of its
imports, these are made up of fuel, vegetable oil,
vehicles, pharmaceutical products, construction
equipment, polymers, tyres and machinery.
Burma’s main trading partners are China, India,
Japan, Indonesia, Germany and Hong Kong
(Trading Economics 2014: 1).
Inward investment is also on the rise following
reforms on land and corporate ownership laws
and financial services. According to the Burmese
investment commission (DICA), inward FDI
increased to US$2.7 billion in 2012–13, up from
US$1.9 billion in 2011–12. DICA also estimated
that some US$54 million of FDI had flowed to
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Burma in September 2013 alone, targeted at the
manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and hotels
and tourism sectors (consult-myanmar.com
2014b). According to some estimates, FDI was
likely to almost nearly triple year-on-year in
2013; FDI for April–December alone amounted
to roughly US$2.15 billion, a 50 per cent increase
over total FDI for the whole of 2012 (Nikkei
Asian Review 2014).
With respect to development assistance, clearly
there is a new international engagement with
Burma. Foreign aid providers from the USA, EU,
UK, Japan, Australia and many others have
moved en masse to offer ODA and to encourage
their businesses and public agencies to embed
themselves in Burma through FDI. In February
2012, the EU announced a foreign aid package to
Burma worth €150 million, adding to an existing
commitment of €50 million and opened an EU
Office in Yangon in April that year, to assist
health, education, livelihoods, government
capacity building and democratisation processes,
inclusive development, aid to uprooted peoples
and civil society. The Asian Development Bank
has granted US$512 million (£325 million), while
the World Bank approved a US$440 million credit
line, the loans only being agreed after Burma
cleared overdue arrears to the two organisations
with Japan’s assistance (BBC News 2013). The
USA re-established the USAID Mission in 2012.
In November 2012, President Obama travelled to
Burma, pledging US$170 million in assistance
over two years (US Government 2013).
Australia’s contribution to Burma in 2012/13 was
A$64.2 million with a proposed 2013/14
expenditure of A$78.8 million; Canberra having
invested A$140.9 million over the previous three
years. The UNDP’s 2013–15 programme,
developed with the Burmese government, ‘aims
to help Myanmar manage a “triple transition”:
nation-building; state-building; and economic
liberalisation, moving the country from a closed,
command economy to an open and transparent
market’ (UNDP 2013a). A central issue raised by
aid donors at the Development Forum was with
regard to the effectiveness of all this development
assistance. The Burmese government signed the
Nay Pyi Taw Accord for Effective Development
Cooperation setting out how the government will
ensure that development cooperation is
transparent and accountable, democratic, and
targeted towards reducing poverty and inequality.
Further statements have followed committing the
government to establishing a robust monitoring
of the disbursements of development assistance
funding and operations.
3 China–Burma relations
3.1 Economic cooperation
China is Burma’s principal trade and investment
partner accounting for a third of Burma’s trade –
annual trade between the two countries is now
worth around US$3.6 billion. China exports raw
materials and equipment to Burma. These are
destined for the Chinese investment projects in
the country. To date, China is the largest single
investor, accounting for almost US$16 billion.
Until the recent agreements to fund energy and
large infrastructure projects, much of China’s
corporate involvement was based on small- and
medium-sized firms coming across the border
from Yunnan Province. But the recent expansion
in Chinese engagement has been driven by
China’s SOEs in the energy, minerals and
construction sectors. Burma is an important
economic interest for Beijing with large stakes in
the mining, oil and gas sectors with
telecommunications next on the agenda.
Estimates vary, but the value of Chinese exports
is in the region of US$2 billion (¥13 billion). For
its part, Burma exports minerals and agricultural
products to China, worth around US$1.6 billion.
Chinese firms already have a firm foothold in
Burma. Over the period 1988–2013, these firms
accounted for almost 33 per cent of the total
US$44 billion invested during these years.
According to recent assessments, the combined
amount of FDI from the Chinese mainland and
Hong Kong – the first and third largest foreign
investors to the country – totalled over
US$20 billion in Burma in 2012, accounting for
nearly half of Burma’s total FDI that year (China
Daily 2013b). The range of activities is
surprisingly diverse – from cement to noodles.
However, all is not plain sailing in this investment
relationship. Following the Burmese government’s
decision to suspend the Letpadaung copper mine
project until 2015 (the date for the next national
elections), Chinese FDI contracted significantly.
In an additional signal of combined commercial
uncertainty and political displeasure in Beijing,
April 2013 saw Sinopec sell its rights in an
onshore Burma oil block it had held since 2004, to
a Taiwanese company (WSJ 2014). Moreover, it is
important to see Chinese FDI in context, relative
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to other investing countries. This is particularly
the case in 2013 as projected full-year results
suggest Chinese FDI to Burma was outstripped by
that of South Korea, Singapore and Japan. On this
estimate, China would slip to around tenth place.
Between April and December 2013, Chinese FDI
totalled approximately US$18 million. With
minimal additional investment, the full-year total
was expected to be in the range of US$20 million;
about 20 per cent of the US$400 million in fiscal
year 2012 and under 1 per cent of the
approximately US$8.2 billion peak in fiscal year
2010. China, having been the leading source of
FDI for fiscal years 2010–12, is anticipated to fall
back to around tenth place in 2013 (Nikkei Asian
Review 2014).
It is important to recognise that Sino–Burmese
economic relations are not monolithic or
homogenised in terms of the range of economic
and political agencies involved. While the inter-
governmental partnership sets the overall
direction of bilateral relations and takes account
of the international context, cooperation takes
place through the multiple tiers of public
administration in both countries, enterprises and
business and cultural associations. One of the
most obvious aspects of this is the relationship
between China’s Yunnan Province and Burma.
Yunnan is the critical entry point for Burmese
exports (legal and illegal) and for the
strategically-vital oil and gas pipelines, as well as
the long-established base of small- and medium-
sized firms operating in Burma. Burma is
Yunnan’s largest trading partner and
Yunnan–Burma trade accounts for 50 per cent of
the total trade between China and Burma. In
2011, total Burmese trade with Yunnan reached
US$2 billion, up about 18 per cent compared to
2010. In 2012, Burma and Yunnan cross-border
trade totalled US$1.7 billion by October; a year-
on-year rise of 2.2 per cent (Ectpa.org 2012). The
trans-border bridgehead with Burma is important
to Beijing leadership as well as the bridgeheads of
Kunming and the other Yunnan cities. For the
latter it is an important commercial link, while
for Beijing it forms part of a wider policy picture;
Yunnan and China’s southwest is designated as a
priority for economic development in Beijing’s
national economic plan and inter-state politics
also enters into Beijing’s perspective.
China’s ‘development’ interest in Burma is
primarily economic. This has two main aspects.
Firstly, Burma as supplier; the country’s location
offers an alternative transit route for Middle East
oil supplied to China, Burmese natural gas
reserves, hydroelectric potential and raw
materials to help meet China’s pressing energy
needs. Secondly, Burma as a market for Chinese
goods, given the anticipated growth of the post-
reform economy. Both aspects can, potentially, act
as development gains for Burma – a part of the
answer to the development challenge –
particularly if Burmese producers are able to
enter into the value chain at a higher stage, based
on a shift to a high-value economy. But they have
also proven to be part of the problem. Chinese
government and SOE corporate closeness to the
Burmese military government and insensitivity to
local community interests have generated
increasing anti-Chinese sentiment unassuaged in
the post-military rule years.
(a) Resources
China needs Burma’s energy and raw materials
which are vital to China’s economic growth. The
world’s second largest economy was expected to
grow by around 8 per cent in 2013. To sustain
growth and meet rising consumer demands, it
needs to import oil, gas and hydroelectric
supplies as well as a range of raw materials from
timber to strategic minerals. China’s energy
needs have grown considerably over the past
30 years of major economic growth and emerging
consumer affluence, outstripping its domestic
sources of supply, turning it into a net importer
of oil and pushing it to import increasing
amounts of oil and gas thereafter (EIA 2013).
According to the EIA, China consumed
10.9 million barrels per day (bpd) but produced
only 4.6 million bpd. China became the world’s
largest oil importer in September 2013 with
demand exceeding supply by 6.3 million bpd
(CBC News 2013).
It is a similar story with natural gas. Consumption
in China went up from 25 billion cubic metres
(bcm) in 2000 to over 100 bcm in 2010, and has
been exceeding domestic production since 2007.
China is actively seeking to cut its carbon emissions
as well as diversify its energy base away from a
68 per cent dependency on coal. The Beijing
government has prioritised natural gas as its best
option – it aims to increase the share of gas in its
energy profile from 4 per cent today to 10 per
cent by 2020. However, while it seeks to double
domestic gas production during this period, it also
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means that it will have to increase its imports
significantly from 28.1 bcm in 2011 to an estimated
77 bcm a year by 2020 (Berdikeeva 2012).
China has a goal to produce at least 15 per cent
of overall energy output by 2020 from renewable
energy sources as the government aims to
address environmental issues. Chinese
companies invested US$65 billion in renewable
energy projects in 2012, 20 per cent higher than
investments in 2011, and they plan to spend
US$473 billion on clean energy investments
between 2011 and 2015 (EIA 2013).
(b) Burma’s market potential
The UNDP argues that, by 2030, the East Asia
and the Pacific region ‘will be home to about
two-thirds of the new global middle class, with
billions of people becoming increasingly
educated, socially engaged and internationally
connected, though at significantly lower income
levels than their counterparts in the middle class
of the industrialised North’ (UNDP 2013b).
Against this regional backdrop, expectations of
future growth in Burma are high in the wake of
President Thein Sein’s reforms. In addition to
the projections of institutions such as the World
Bank (Asian News Network 2013a) on Burma’s
potential GDP growth, some assessments, such
as that of the McKinsey Global Institute, suggest
that if the reform aims are realised, then
Burma’s GDP could quadruple in size over the
next 20 years. This would see an increase to
US$200 billion, recording annual growth rates
commensurate with those of China at 8 per cent
and attracting US$100 million FDI. The
financial services and telecommunications
sectors each offering a potential 23 per cent
compound annual growth rate over the 2010–13
period (Bloomberg 2013).
Burma’s new enterprise and ownership laws also
open up the country’s economy as an export
platform to Europe and US markets as sanctions
and embargoes are lifted and new trade and
investment agreements come into force. This is
already the case with South Korean firms moving
into the Burmese textiles sector, some relocating
from China, where rising labour costs are now
becoming a factor.
3.2 China’s development assistance
‘Development’ and international development
assistance, as a defined area of Chinese foreign
policy remains a work-in-process (Lum 2009).
Overseas development is a relatively new factor
for Beijing and a learning experience. The
Chinese government published its first White
Paper in 2011. Western or ‘traditional’ donor
definitions and terminology, such as that of
OECD-DAC, still do not translate readily into
the current core concepts of China’s political
culture; for example, the concepts of economic
or development aid is subsumed by the
overarching concept of ‘economic cooperation’.
This term is deliberately broad, designed for the
whole spectrum of economic and related non-
economic activity and includes, therefore,
development aid, loans, technical assistance and
state-sponsored investments.
With regard to Burma, China’s main forms of
economic cooperation are: grant aid, interest-
free loans, and concessional loans, technical
assistance, and debt relief. China provides
assistance through concessional loans and grants
in the key areas: agriculture, natural resource
exploration, infrastructure, telecommunications,
human resource management and industrial
processing. In 2010 China pledged to provide
Burma with US$4.2 billion worth of interest-free
loans over a 30-year period to help fund
hydropower projects, road and railway
construction and IT infrastructure. China also
provided Burma with technical assistance for
agriculture development. Agriculture contributes
30 per cent of Burma’s GDP with 61 per cent of
the workforce in this sector. Beset by low crop
production and farmer incomes, China
collaborates with Burmese and Swiss
organisations to provide training, technical
advice, visits and exchanges and scientific
cooperation to increase maize and rice
production (CABI 2013).
Infrastructure provision is, of course, key. China
is involved in all aspects of Burma’s
infrastructural capacity building including new
airports, dams, bridges, rail and port facilities.
China Communications Construction (CCC) has
been constructing the US$100 million airport in
the new capital Naypyidaw, financed on
reportedly generous terms by a China EximBank
loan. In hydropower, the massive 7,110 MW
Tasang Dam on the Salween River in Shan State,
costing at least US$6 billion, is majority owned
and constructed by the SOE, China Gezhouba.
Sinohydro, China’s largest dam builder has built
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a number of hydropower stations in Burma,
including the Yeywa hydropower station on-
stream in October 2011 (Myanmar Business
Network 2011).
After three years of discussion and delay, the two
governments agreed during President Thein Sein’s
visit to Beijing in late May 2011 to build an 810km
rail link between Yunnan and Burma’s Indian
Ocean port of Kyaukpyu via Muse. The China
Development Bank provided a US$763 million line
of credit to the Burmese government during this
visit. Under the rail agreement, China Railway
would be responsible for building the line (phase
one of five due for completion in 2014). While the
Chinese communiqué justified the new link as
strengthening bilateral economic ties that would
‘boost the economic growth’ of Burma, China’s
involvement is driven by its aim of strengthening
its existing oil and gas ‘hub’ around Kyaukpyu in
order to then parallel its new oil and gas pipelines
stretching across to Yunnan which, in turn, Beijing
is intent on liberating from its landlocked
economic constraints to develop its western region
as it lags behind the eastern coastal provinces. The
project raises several human rights issues. Human
Rights Watch’s David Mathieson argues that ‘The
railroad will pass though parts of the Shan state
that are still contested. But I’m more concerned
about the security corridor attached to such
projects, which have a past record for human
rights abuses such as forced labour and land
confiscation’ (Railpage 2011).
China’s development approach is evident too in
the controversial oil and gas pipeline construction.
The project has been seeking to offset widespread
opposition to the project and criticism of land
expropriations, enforced dispossession, corruption
and ecological disregard for rivers and forests.
The project claims to have provided over 6,000 jobs
for locals for the construction work, and involved
over 220 Burmese firms with their employees
being technically trained. They point to
development aid projects undertaken along gas
pipeline routes with US$20 million donated for
use in education, medical treatment, health and
disaster relief, 45 schools and 24 clinics built to
improve the teaching facilities for 19,000 students
and medical facilities for 800,000 local people.
The venture offered US$10 million to repair a
high voltage power grid line in Kyaukpyu, in
which CNPC’s donation accounted for
US$3 million. In the second half of 2012, when
Rakhine State experienced communal rioting, the
project provided US$50,000 cash aid and ten
tonnes of rice. Moreover, they also donated
US$50,000 to earthquake victims in central
Burma (China Daily 2013b). Similarly, the
company behind the oil pipeline, SEAOP,
committed itself to ‘assist’ Burma in implementing
25 development projects in its pipeline project
areas, worth US$1 million, in Rakhine State and
the Magway region, providing 21 schools, two
clinics and two kindergartens. The company
claimed that, on completion, 1,320 villager
patients, 105 preschool age children and 1,891
students would have benefited (GOV.cn 2012).
Illustrative of China’s approach is the experience
of one Chinese firm in the Burmese market, the
China National Machinery Import and Export
Corporation (CMC). The firm has followed a
classic strategy of China’s ‘going out’ policy of
exporting from China, followed by in-country
production backed by Chinese government
development cooperation assistance. In the
1990s, the company exported railway locomotives
to Myanmar. In 2000, the company established
LPG factories in Nyaungdon and Kyunchaung. In
the 2004–08 period, CMC built a number of ‘free
aid’ projects on behalf of the Chinese
government. These included a hydroelectric
assembly plant, Mandalay industrial training
centre, and an electricity meter factory. In 2007,
the firm also drew on Chinese government
preferential loans for the Burmese government to
provide 20,000 tonnes of steel rails for Burma’s
Ministry of Railways. In 2010 the company and
the Ministry of Railways signed an MoU making
use of Chinese government preferential loans to
construct a new locomotive assembly plant and
bus assembly plant (CMC 2014).
China also provided humanitarian assistance to
Burma for purposes of disaster relief, drugs
control, education, medical and health. For
example, China promised US$4.3 million in aid in
addition to an initial US$1 million in the
aftermath of the 2008 Cyclone Nargis. In 2013
China pledged aid for the resettlement of Burma’s
homeless in western Rakhine State and victims of
the earthquake in northern Burma in the form of
350 integrated housing units worth 30 million
yuan and US$1 million in cash for the
resettlement of the victims (Chinese Embassy
2013). Technical assistance has also been extended
to provide human resources training to about
Renwick China’s Role in Burma’s Development78
2Gu&Carty IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:51  Page 78
2,000 persons covering more than 20 sectors, and
aid in the form of engineering machinery, medical
instruments and teaching equipment. For
example, China equipped Yangon University and
Mandalay University with 1,500 computers (ibid.).
3.3 Political relations
The modern diplomatic relationship goes back
to establishment of formal relations between
Burma and the PRC in 1950. The diplomatic
language of high-level meetings frequently
refers to their shared paukphaw (fraternal)
friendship. Certainly, there is a historical legacy
at play here, China’s long-standing political
support for Burma during its long years of
international exile, vetoing condemnatory
resolutions in the UN Security Council being
merely one obvious feature of such support.
China’s public position is that it supports
Burma’s decision to reform. China has had a
series of high-level reciprocal visits to maintain
dialogue with the Burmese government to
ensure sustained and sustainable bilateral
relations with the new reforming administration.
China’s consideration here is that the process of
wholesale societal transformation being
undertaken in a relatively short time schedule
maintains the stability of Burma; a managed
process of reform that will not create instability
in an adjacent state and threaten the viability of
Chinese assets and operations in the country.
Beijing was widely held to have been slow off the
mark in recognising and responding to the
changes in Burma (Horton 2013). However
accurate such impressions were, the Chinese
government has moved to shore up its bilateral
political ties with the new Burmese civilian
leadership. Yet, an issue here relates to the very
character of change taking place in Burma, with
distinct resonances for China’s own domestic
and international reform trajectory. China’s
leaderships have always favoured and felt more
comfortable working through government-to-
government relations. However, as in China,
processes of economic and social change press
political adjustments too. In China, the
government has widely advocated the
importance of people-to-people relations and the
newly adopted reform strategy under President
Xi Jinping has identified a more prominent role
to be encouraged by civil society organisations.
In Burma, political reform has opened up a new
space for civil society and the media and also for
new influence in the ethnic-oriented politics of
Burma’s constitutive states. There is, therefore,
recognition of a need to engage in a more
committed and demonstrably genuine way to
the emerging role of Burmese civil society – one
deeply sceptical or opposed to China’s presence
(Berger 2013; Yang 2012).
The suspension of the Letpadaung copper mine by
the Burmese government is more than a symbolic
act. It is indicative of two elements of change.
Firstly, as just noted above, the emergence of civil
society and a rapid emergence of communities and
societal groups willing and able to act on their new
political freedoms – in this instance in protesting
against those projects and their corporate sponsors
that they argue have involved no consultation,
recognition of villager interests and concerns,
forced, uncompensated removals from their land,
environmental threat or damage, and which are
not going to contribute financially or in terms of
employment, training or local traders. Late March
2014 saw thousands of Burmese people take part
in a mass protest march seeking an outright
termination of the project (The Irrawaddy 2014a).
The Chinese approach has been criticised within
China itself as well as in Burma. Corporate social
responsibility, while understood in Chinese
business and government, is still in its fledgling
stage in China itself, and often not recognised as a
legitimate corporate interest for Chinese firms
‘going out’ across the global economy. Chinese
government spokespersons publicly stress that the
government encourages social responsibility by
Chinese firms in Burma, claiming that these
Chinese companies have provided aid worth
US$71 million to Myanmar in education, health
and natural disaster mitigation and created jobs
for 15,000 people (Chinese Embassy 2013).
Nonetheless, there are signs of change evident in
the corporate sector. In response to the
Letpadaung mine suspension, the Chinese
developer, Wanbao Mining Ltd, a subsidiary of
state-owned Chinese arms manufacturer China
North Industries Corporation, signed a revised
contract in October 2013, increasing its
investment from US$600 million to
US$997 million, cutting its share of profits from
49 per cent to 30 per cent (Burma government
receiving 51 per cent, up from 4 per cent under the
original contract). It also promised more than
US$1 million a year in social investments in
villages around the mining site. The company will
also channel 2 per cent of profits towards
corporate social responsibility projects once the
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mine is in operation. Yet, illustrative of the legacy
of military rule, Wanbao’s original partner, the
military-backed Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings, will still have a stake in the profits,
albeit with its share drastically cut from 45 per
cent to 19 per cent, once the mine is back to
producing copper (WSJ 2014).
Secondly, Letpadaung is also highly instructive for
the Chinese government in underlining a change in
attitude to development assistance and
infrastructural development project funding and
management towards China. The Burmese
government turned down a US$2 billion Chinese
government loan to construct a proposed highway
linking the planned Kyaukpyu industrial zone on
Burma’s west coast, with Ruili in southwest China,
preferring instead that the roadway be developed
under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme in
which the investors usually recoup their outlay
through payments by users, accrued while investors
operate the project after it opens. Burma’s Deputy
Construction Minister Win Myint stated that: ‘If
they want to construct this highway they can make
a joint venture with a Myanmar company. If they
want to build this road from the China side, they
are welcome’. The proposed roadway will link
Kyaukpyu, site of a proposed 1,000-acre Special
Economic Zone (SEZ) and deep-sea port on
Burma’s Bay of Bengal coast, to Ruili, a Chinese
town just across the border from Muse in Shan
State. Burma’s Railway Ministry is currently also
reviewing a Chinese proposal to build an almost
900km rail line from Kyaukpyu to Kunming; which
is likely also to be built and operated under a BOT
scheme (The Irrawaddy 2014b).
If there are national Burmese factors here for
China, there are also regional political
considerations as well. Relations with Burma are
contextualised by China’s relationship with
ASEAN. China’s leadership has recommitted
itself to working closely with Southeast Asia and
with ASEAN as it moves to the threshold of the
ASEAN Regional Community and closer
integration between its members (Hendrikson
2013). Burma is politically important to China for
added potential regional influence. Burma’s
political standing has risen since 2011; 2014 sees
Burma’s tenure of the Chair of ASEAN and will
host the organisation’s Summit. ASEAN itself is
bringing in its own ASEAN Economic Community
in 2015 and overlaps with China’s ASEAN–China
Free Trade Area.
For China, a close relationship with Burma also
carries a political message to both the global
North and South, one now familiar in Africa and
Latin America. Beijing’s message is that, as a
former colonialised country and still a developing
country, China understands and stands alongside
the developing world. This rhetoric dovetails
nicely for China’s current political worldview.
Developing world solidarity overlaps with
China’s ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’ and the
‘Bandung Spirit’. These are woven into deeply-
rooted anti-imperialism narratives in Chinese
public political discourse, the ‘Five Principles’
being cited as the opening point of the 2011
China–Burma Strategic Partnership agreement.
3.4 Security relations
The central Chinese security interests in Burma
are that of border security and protection of
Chinese strategic oil and gas supply pipelines.
(a) Border security
Border security has featured prominently in the
series of China–Burma high-level leadership
visits since the election of the civilian
government, as well as in the Strategic
Partnership agreement. Instability and violence
in adjacent Kachin State between the Burmese
army and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA),
the armed wing of the KIO, has reverberations
in China’s neighbouring Yunnan Province; four
rockets have exploded in the border areas north
of Ruili since December 2012. Beijing’s concern
is over the potential for a ‘spillover’ of this ethnic
conflict into Yunnan, itself a multi-ethnic
community (The Irrawaddy 2012). Yunnan has
seen an influx of displaced persons, an estimated
60,000 at the height of the conflict. But the
border security issue is broader in scope,
including illegal trans-border trade from drugs,
logging (Global Witness 2009; Asian News
Network 2013b) and human trafficking.
There is also a sizable Chinese–Burmese
community, estimated at around 1.6 million and
China has taken a closer interest in the
wellbeing of Chinese communities in Southeast
Asia, including Burma, following attacks on
ethnic Chinese in the region. This Chinese
community in Burma is centuries old
(Vandenbosch 1947). Inflows of Chinese
immigrants came in the period of British
colonialism and in the wake of the Communist
victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949.
Renwick China’s Role in Burma’s Development80
2Gu&Carty IDSB45.4.qxd  24/06/2014  10:51  Page 80
Resentment at the economic and cultural impact
of this ethnic group has simmered, boiling over
in the 1967 Yangon riots and the expulsion of
Chinese communities from Burma, and
generating hostility in both countries and in
2008, open violence against Burma’s Chinese
community.
(b) Strategic security
Burma is being portrayed as a new ‘battleground’
in a Sino–US ‘proxy war’. Burma’s strategic
significance has skyrocketed in the past two years.
It is a vital Chinese strategic interest for a number
of reasons. It is at a geo-strategic crossroads –
upwards to China, northwest to India and eastwards
to Thailand and Southeast Asia. Neo-containment
or not, Burma is strategically sensitive.
For example, China imports growing amounts of
oil and gas from the Middle East. Burma’s
geography offers China an important friend on
the Andaman Sea by offering means of patrolling
more extensively and for longer China’s critical
supply routes from the Gulf through the Indian
Ocean and Straits of Malacca with some risk of
piracy. To counter supply risk, China has
developed US$2.5 billion worth of new pipelines
taking oil and natural gas from Burma itself and
as a transit from the Middle East. Cutting a
swathe across Burma, from its deep-water port of
Kyaukpyu in the Bay of Bengal in the west to
Muse in the east, these are key strategic assets
for China and at almost 800km, are long and
exposed. This generates revenue for Burma. But
whose Burma? Who benefits from such revenues
(Linn 2012)? Given the duration of the military
rule, it is a short period of time and requisite of a
massive concerted and politically-charged
process since 2011 to enact root-and-branch
reform across the whole system. Nonetheless, the
critical issue remains the structural power of the
Burmese armed forces (Tatmadaw) in the
Burmese market, alleged corporate cronyism and
its long-established relations with segments of
the Chinese military-political-economic elite.
The gas taps turned on in 2013 (People’s Daily
Online 2013), but the projects are mired in
controversy and opposition. In addition, Burma’s
Rakhine State, where the pipeline begins, saw
inter-communal violence between Buddhists and
Muslims in June and October 2012 which left
hundreds dead and injured. Oil and gas sales,
sales of legally (and illegally) logged timber as
well as narcotics from Burma’s poppy-fields are
all, allegedly, tied up with the Burmese military,
its corporate grip on the country and its arms
purchases.
But the competitive dimension with Japan is
evident in the latter’s ODA provision for
Burma’s port modernisation announced in
December 2013 with the construction of two new
general cargo wharves at the Myanmar
International Terminals Thilawa (MITT) port
paid for with a US$205 million Japanese ODA
loan (consult-myanmar.com 2013).
4 Conclusions
International politics are rarely, if ever, ‘zero-
sum’. China’s interests in Burma, including a
national interest in supporting Burma’s
economic and socio-political development, are
clear. China’s development assistance is framed
in a wider concept and practice of ‘economic
cooperation’. This is delivering (swiftly) much-
needed major infrastructure to Burma.
Burma and China have symbiotic interests and
long-standing relations that mean that, quite
apart from the imperatives of geography, their
relationship will be relatively close. But the
relationship has been significantly one-sided in
favour of China and Burma is now seeking to
balance its China interests with those of a newly
engaged international community and to work
with China on a more equitable basis, for
example, through BOT agreements and more
joint ventures.
This analysis has shown Burma’s immense
potential and sought to demonstrate China’s
continuing ‘economic cooperation’ approach to
Burmese development. What more could or
should China be doing to more readily provide
effective assistance for Burma’s development?
The Chinese central government and Chinese
enterprises need to adjust to Burma’s new
economic, political and social condition in
practice rather than with mere diplomatic
rhetoric. A failure to do so has contributed to an
exacerbation of the long-standing popular latent
antipathy towards the Chinese state and
enterprise presence in China. Such an
adjustment could include:
z A continued incorporation of the international
conception, accepted principles and practices
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of ‘development assistance’ into China’s
‘economic cooperation’ and ‘comprehensive
cooperation partnership’ with Burma. China
should broaden its development profile
beyond narrow national economic self-interest
– best characterised perhaps as an
‘enlightened self-interest’;
z To do this there needs to be a greater
commitment to corporate social responsibility
by more Chinese firms in Burma which would
begin the process of ameliorating anti-Chinese
sentiment. Faced with growing and widening
popular protests against many of China’s
Burmese ‘mega-projects’ and important signals
of Chinese government disquiet in the Chinese
official press, Chinese SOEs involved have
poured money into social and economic
developments in their project areas. However,
given the damage already done to the image of
China in Burma, throwing money at the
problem is proving insufficient to quell local
discontent which views this as a cynical tactic
rather than a demonstrable change in corporate
culture and practice. For this to change, such
corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives
need to be backed by additional measures by
the Chinese government, for example,
becoming a supporting country to the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) and a more robust promotion of CSR to
Chinese business in association with Chinese
business councils, and building on its existing
public relations campaigns with local Burmese
communities (Sun 2012);
z Chinese firms in Burma committing to
greater transparency and accountability,
adopting an inclusive and equitable approach
to project contracting and development and
adhering to new Burmese regulations for
social and environmental impact assessment.
These are achievable initiatives. A sustainably
developing Burma is in China’s own national
interest and can deepen the developmental
dimension of paukphaw (fraternal) friendship in
the coming years.
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